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Employment growth is strongly predicted by smaller average establishment size, both across
cities and across industries within cities, but there is little consensus on why this relationship
exists. Traditional economic explanations emphasize factors that reduce entry costs or raise
entrepreneurial returns, thereby increasing net returns and attracting entrepreneurs. A second
class of theories hypothesizes that some places are endowed with a greater supply of entrepre-
neurship. Evidence on sales per worker does not support the higher returns for entrepreneurship
rationale. Our evidence suggests that entrepreneurship is higher when ￿xed costs are lower and
when there are more entrepreneurial people.
JEL Classi￿cation: J2, L0, L1, L2, L6, O3, R2.
Key Words: Entrepreneurship, Industrial Organization, Chinitz, Agglomeration, Clusters,
Cities.1 Introduction
Economic growth is highly correlated with an abundance of small, entrepreneurial ￿rms. Figure
1 shows that a 10% increase in the number of ￿rms per worker in 1977 at the city level correlates
with a 9% increase in employment growth between 1977 and 2000. This relationship is even
stronger looking across industries within cities. This relationship has been taken as evidence for
competition spurring technological progress (Glaeser et al., 1992), product cycles where growth is
faster at earlier stages (Miracky, 1993), and the importance of entrepreneurship for area success
(Acs and Armington, 2006; Glaeser, 2007). Any of these interpretations is compatible with
Figure 1￿ s correlation, however, and the only thing that we can be sure of is that entrepreneurial
clusters exist in some areas but not in others.
We begin by documenting systematically some basic facts about average establishment size
and new employment growth through entrepreneurship. We analyze entry and industrial struc-
tures at both the region and city levels using the Longitudinal Business Database. Section 2
con￿rms that the strong correlation in Figure 1 holds true under stricter frameworks and when
using simple spatial instruments for industrial structures. A 10% increase in average establish-
ment size in 1992 associates with a 7% decline in subsequent employment growth due to new
startups. Employment growth due to facility expansions also falls by almost 5%. We further
document that these reductions come primarily through weaker employment growth in small
entrants.
What can explain these spatial di⁄erences? We ￿rst note that the connection between average
establishment size and subsequent entrepreneurship is empirically stronger at the city-industry
level than on either dimension individually. This suggests that simple theories emphasizing just
industry-wide or city-wide forces are insu¢ cient. Theories must instead build upon particular
city-industry traits or on endogenous spatial sorting and organizational forms due to interactions
of city traits with industry traits.
We consider three broad rationales. The ￿rst two theories emphasize spatial di⁄erences in
net returns to entrepreneurship, while the last theory emphasizes spatial di⁄erences in the sup-
ply of entrepreneurs. The former theories are more common among economists. They assume
that entrepreneurs choose locations and compete within a national market, so that the supply
of entrepreneurship is constant over space. This frictionless setting would not hold for concrete
manufacturing, of course, but would be a good starting point for many industries. Entrepre-
neurship is then evident where ￿rm pro￿ts are higher or where ￿xed costs are lower, either of
which increases the net returns to opening a new business.
These spatial di⁄erences could be due to either exogenous or endogenous forces. To take
Silicon Valley as an example, one story would suggest that Silicon Valley￿ s high rate of entrepre-
neurship over the past 30 years was due to abnormal returns in California￿ s computer sector as
the industry took o⁄. These returns would need to have been greater than California￿ s and the
1computer industry￿ s returns generally, perhaps descending from a technological breakthrough
outside of the existing core for the industry (e.g., Duranton, 2007; Kerr, this issue).
On the other hand, Saxenian￿ s (1994) classic analysis of Silicon Valley noted its abundance
of smaller, independent ￿rms relative to Boston￿ s Route 128 corridor. Following Chinitz (1961)
and Jacobs (1970), Saxenian argued that these abundant small ￿rms themselves caused further
entrepreneurship by lowering the e⁄ective cost of entry through the development of independent
suppliers, venture capitalists, entrepreneurial culture, and so on. While distinct, both of these
perspectives argue that spatial di⁄erences in net returns to entrepreneurship are responsible for
the di⁄erences in entrepreneurship rates that we see empirically.
An alternative class of theories, which Chinitz also highlighted, is that the supply of en-
trepreneurship di⁄ers across space. Heterogeneity in supply may re￿ ect historical accident or
relatively exogenous variables. William Shockley￿ s presence in Silicon Valley was partly due
to historical accident (Shockley￿ s mother), and entrepreneurs can be attracted to California￿ s
sunshine and proximity to Stanford independent of di⁄erences in net returns. Several empirical
studies ￿nd entrepreneurs are more likely to be from their region of birth than wage workers,
and that local entrepreneurs operate stronger businesses (e.g., Figueiredo et al., 2002; Michelacci
and Silva, 2007). Immobile workers may possess traits that lend them to entrepreneurship (e.g.,
high human capital). Although quite di⁄erent internally, these theories broadly suggest that
semi-permanent di⁄erences in entrepreneurial supply exist spatially.1
While theories of the last kind are deserving of examination, they do not ￿t easily into basic
economic models that include both ￿rm formation and location choice. Section 3 presents just
such a model that draws on Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The baseline model illustrates the ￿rst class
of theories that focus on the returns to entrepreneurship, as well as the di¢ culties of reconciling
heterogeneity in entrepreneurial supply with the canonical framework of spatial economics. Two
basic, intuitive results are that there will be more startups and smaller ￿rms in sectors or areas
where the ￿xed costs of production are lower or where the returns to entrepreneurship are higher.
In the model, higher returns are due to more inelastic demand. A third result formalizes Chinitz￿ s
logic that entrepreneurship will be higher in places that have exogenously come to have more
independent suppliers. Multiple equilibria are possible where some cities end up with a smaller
number of vertically integrated ￿rms, like Pittsburgh, and others end up with a larger number
of independent ￿rms.
But, our model breaks with Chinitz by assuming a constant supply of entrepreneurs across
space. While we assume that skilled workers play a disproportionately large role in entre-
preneurship, we also require a spatial equilibrium that essentially eliminates heterogeneity in
entrepreneurship supply. In a sense, the model and our subsequent empirical work show how far
one can get without assuming that the supply of entrepreneurship di⁄ers across space (due to
1These explanations are not mutually exclusive, especially in a dynamic setting. Areas that develop entre-
preneurial clusters due to net returns may acquire attributes that promote a future supply of entrepreneurs
independent of the factors.
2one or more of the potential theories). We operationalize this test by trying to explain away the
average establishment size e⁄ect.
Section 4 presents evidence on these hypotheses. Our ￿rst tests look at sales per worker among
small ￿rms as a proxy for the returns to entrepreneurship. The strong relationship between initial
industry structure and subsequent entry does not extend to entrepreneurial returns. While some
entrepreneurial clusters are likely to be demand driven, the broader patterns suggest that higher
gross returns do not account for the observed link between lower initial establishment size and
subsequent entry prevalent in all sectors. We likewise con￿rm that di⁄erences in product cycles
or region-industry age do not account for the patterns. These results are more compatible with
views emphasizing lower ￿xed costs or a greater supply of entrepreneurs.
Our next two tests show that costs for entrepreneurs matter. Holding city-industry estab-
lishment size constant, subsequent employment growth is further aided by small establishments
in other industries within the city. This result supports the view that having small independent
suppliers and customers is bene￿cial for entrepreneurship (e.g., Glaeser and Kerr, 2009). We ￿nd
a substantially weaker correlation between city-level establishment size and the facility growth
of existing ￿rms, which further supports this interpretation. We also use labor intensity at the
region-industry level to proxy for ￿xed costs. We ￿nd a strong positive correlation between
labor intensity and subsequent startup growth, which again supports the view that ￿xed costs
are important. However, while individually powerful, neither of these tests explains away much
of the basic establishment size e⁄ect.
We ￿nally test sorting hypotheses. The linkage between employment growth and small
establishment size is deeper than simple industry-wide or city-wide forces like entrepreneurs
generally being attracted to urban areas with lots of amenities. Instead, as our model suggests,
we look at interactions between city-level characteristics and industry-level characteristics. For
example, the model suggests that entrepreneurship will be higher and establishment size lower
in high amenity places among industries with lower ￿xed costs. The evidence supports several
hypotheses suggested by the model, but controlling for di⁄erent forces again does little to explain
away the small establishment size e⁄ect. Neither human capital characteristics of the area nor
amenities can account for much of the observed e⁄ect.
In summary, our results document the remarkable correlation between average initial es-
tablishment size and subsequent employment growth due to startups. The evidence does not
support the view that this correlation descends from regional di⁄erences in demand for entre-
preneurship. The data are more compatible with di⁄erences in entrepreneurship being due to
cost factors, but our cost proxies still do not explain much of the establishment size e⁄ect. Our
results are also compatible with the Chinitz view that some places just have a greater supply
of entrepreneurs, although this supply must be something quite di⁄erent from the overall level
of human capital. We hope that future work will focus on whether the small establishment size
e⁄ect re￿ ects entrepreneurship supply or heterogeneity in ￿xed costs that we have been unable
3to capture empirically.2
2 Clusters of Competition and Entrepreneurship
We begin with a description of the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). We then document
a set of stylized facts about employment growth due to entrepreneurship. These descriptive
pieces particularly focus on industry structure and labor intensity to guide and motivate the
development of our model in Section 3.
2.1 LBD and US Entry Patterns
The LBD provides annual observations for every private-sector establishment with payroll from
1976 onward. The Census Bureau data are an unparalleled laboratory for studying entrepre-
neurship rates and the life cycles of US ￿rms. Sourced from US tax records and Census Bureau
surveys, the micro-records document the universe of establishments and ￿rms rather than a
strati￿ed random sample or published aggregate tabulations. In addition, the LBD lists physical
locations of establishments rather than locations of incorporation, circumventing issues related
to higher legal incorporations in states like Delaware. Jarmin and Miranda (2002) describe the
construction of the LBD.
The comprehensive nature of the LBD facilitates complete characterizations of entrepreneur-
ial activity by cities and industries, types of ￿rms, and establishment entry sizes. Each establish-
ment is given a unique, time-invariant identi￿er that can be longitudinally tracked. This allows
us to identify the year of entry for new startups or the opening of new plants by existing ￿rms.
We de￿ne entry as the ￿rst year in which an establishment has positive employment. We only
consider the ￿rst entry for cases in which an establishment temporarily ceases operations (e.g.,
seasonal ￿rms, major plant retoolings) and later re-enters the LBD. Second, the LBD assigns
a ￿rm identi￿er to each establishment that facilitates a linkage to other establishments in the
LBD. This ￿rm hierarchy allows us to separate new startups from facility expansions by existing
multi-unit ￿rms.
Table 1 characterizes entry patterns from 1992 to 1999. The ￿rst column refers to all new
establishment formations. The second column looks only at those establishments that are not
part of an existing ￿rm in the database, which we de￿ne as entrepreneurship. The ￿nal column
2In a study of entrepreneurship in the manufacturing sector, Glaeser and Kerr (2009) found that the Chinitz
e⁄ect was a very strong predictor of new ￿rm entry. The e⁄ect dominated other agglomeration interactions
among ￿rms or local area traits. This paper seeks to measure this e⁄ect for other sectors and assess potential
forces underlying the relationship. As such, this paper is also closely related and complementary to the work
of Rosenthal and Strange (2009) using Dun and Bradstreet data. Beyond entrepreneurship, Drucker and Feser
(2007) consider the productivity consequences of the Chinitz e⁄ect in the manufacturing sector, and Li and Yu
(2009) provide evidence from China. Prior work on entry patterns using the Census Bureau data include Davis
et al. (1996), Delgado et al. (2008, 2009), Dunne et al. (1989a, 1989b), Haltiwanger et al. (this issue), and Kerr
and Nanda (2009a, 2009b).
4looks at new establishments that are part of an existing ￿rm, which we frequently refer to as
facility expansions.
Over the sample period, there were on average over 700,000 new establishments per annum,
with 7.3 million employees. Single-unit startups account for 80% of new establishments but only
53% of new employment. Facility expansions are, on average, about 3.6 times larger than new
startups. Table 1 documents the distribution of establishment entry sizes for these two types.
Over 75% of new startups begin with ￿ve or fewer employees, versus fewer than half of entrants
for expansion establishments of existing ￿rms. About 0.5% of independent startups begin with
more than 100 workers, compared to 4% of expansion establishments.
Across industries, startups are concentrated in services (39%), retail trade (23%), and con-
struction (13%). Facility expansions are concentrated in retail trade (32%), services (30%), and
￿nance, insurance, and real estate (18%). The growing region of the South has the most new
establishment formations, and regional patterns across the two classes of new establishments are
quite similar. This uniformity, however, masks the agglomeration that frequently exists at the
industry level. Well-known examples include the concentration of the automotive industry in
Detroit, tobacco in Virginia and North Carolina, and high-tech entrepreneurship within regions
like Silicon Valley and Boston￿ s Route 128.
2.2 Industry Structure and Entrepreneurship
Table 2 shows the basic fact that motivates this paper: the correlation between average estab-
lishment size and employment growth. We use both regions and metropolitan areas for spatial
variation in this paper. While we prefer to analyze metropolitan areas, the city-level data become
too thin for some of our variables when we use detailed industries. The dependent variable in
the ￿rst three columns is the log employment growth in the region-industry due to new startups.
The dependent variable for the second set of three columns is the log employment growth in the
region-industry due to new facility expansions that are part of existing ￿rms.
Panel A uses the log of average establishment size in the region-industry as the key inde-
pendent variable. Panel B uses the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in the region-industry as
our measure of industrial concentration. Regressions include the initial period￿ s employment in
the region as a control variable. For each industry, we exclude the region with the lowest level
of initial employment. This excluded region-industry is employed in the instrumental variable
speci￿cations. Crossing eight regions and 349 SIC3 industries yields 2,712 observations as not
every region includes all industries. Estimations are unweighted and cluster standard errors by
industry.
The ￿rst regression, in the upper left hand corner of the table, shows that the elasticity
of employment growth in startups to initial employments is 0.97. This suggests that, holding
mean establishment size constant, the number of startups scales almost one-for-one with existing
employment. The elasticity of birth employment with respect to average establishment size in the
5region-industry is -0.67. This relationship is both large and precisely estimated. It suggests that,
holding initial employments constant, a 10% increase in average establishment size is associated
with a 7% decline in the employment growth in new startups. These initial estimates control
for region ￿xed e⁄ects (FEs) but not for industry FEs. Column 2 includes industry FEs so that
all of the variation is coming from regional di⁄erences within an industry. The coe¢ cient on
average establishment size of -0.64 is remarkably close to that estimated in Column 1.
In the third regression, we instrument for observed average establishment size using the mean
establishment size in the excluded region by industry. This instrument strategy only exploits
industry-level variation, so we cannot include industry FEs. The estimated elasticities are again
quite similar. These instrumental speci￿cations suggest that the central relationship is not
purely due to local feedback e⁄ects, where a high rate of growth in one particular region leads
to an abundance of small ￿rms in that place. Likewise, the relationship is not due to measuring
existing employment and average establishment size from the same data.
Panel B of Table 2 considers the log HHI index of concentration within each region-industry.
While the model in the next section suggests using average establishment size to model industrial
structure, there is also a long tradition of empirically modeling industrial structure through HHI
metrics.3 The results using this technique are quite similar to Panel A. A 10% increase in
region-industry concentration in 1992 is associated with a 4% decline in employment due to new
startups over 1992-1999. The coe¢ cient on initial region-industry employment, however, is lower
in this case. When not controlling for initial establishment size, there is a less than one-for-one
relationship between initial employment and later growth through startups.
Column 2 of Panel B again models industry FEs. The coe¢ cients are less stable than in the
upper panel. The elasticity of startup employment to the HHI index continues to be negative
and extremely signi￿cant, but it loses over 50% of its economic magnitude compared to the ￿rst
column. Column 3 instruments using the concentration level in the omitted region. The results
here are quite similar to those in the ￿rst column.
Columns 4 to 6 of Table 2 consider employment growth from new facility expansions by multi-
unit ￿rms instead of new startups. These new establishments are not new entrepreneurship per
se, but instead represent existing ￿rms opening new production facilities, sales o¢ ces, and similar
operations. Nevertheless, formations of new establishments represent more discontinuous events
than simple employment growth at existing plants. Again, there is a strong negative e⁄ect
of mean establishment size in the region-industry and subsequent employment growth due to
facility expansions. The e⁄ect, however, is weaker than in the startup regressions. The results are
basically unchanged when we include industry FEs or in the instrumental variables regression.
These conclusions are also mirrored in Panel B￿ s estimations using HHI concentration measures.
3The appendix also reports estimations using the share of employees in a region-industry working in estab-
lishments with 20 employees or fewer. This modelling strategy delivers similar results to mean establishment size
or HHI concentration.
62.3 Variations by Sector
Figures 2a and 2b document estimations of the relationship between establishment entry rates
and initial region-industry structure by sector. The underlying regressions, which are reported
in the appendix, include region and industry FEs and control for log initial employment in
region-industry. The squares document the point estimates, and the lines provide con￿dence
bands of two standard errors. Negative coe¢ cients again associate greater entry over 1992-1999
with smaller average establishment size by region-industry in 1992.
Figure 2a shows that the average establishment size e⁄ect is present for startups in all sectors
to at least a 10% con￿dence level. The elasticity is largest and most precisely estimated for
manufacturing at greater than -0.8; the elasticity estimate for ￿nance, insurance, and real estate
is the weakest but still has a point estimate of -0.2. On the other hand, Figure 2b shows the
average establishment e⁄ect is only present for facility expansions in manufacturing, mining, and
construction. This relative concentration in manufacturing is striking, as this sector was the
subject of the original Chinitz study and much of the subsequent research. The di⁄erence in
levels between Figures 2a and 2b also speaks to concentration among startups￿ in every sector,
the average establishment size e⁄ect is largest for new entrepreneurs.4
2.4 Entry Size Distribution
Table 3 quanti￿es how these e⁄ects di⁄er across establishment entry sizes. Table 1 shows that
most new establishments are quite small, while others have more than 100 workers. We separate
out the employment growth due to new startups into groupings with 1-5, 6-20, 21-100, and 101+
workers in their ￿rst year of observation. Panel A again considers average ￿rm size, while Panel
B uses the HHI concentration measure. These estimations only include region FEs, and the
appendix reports similar patterns when industry FEs are also modelled.
A clear pattern exists across the entry size distribution. Larger average establishment size
and greater industrial concentration retard entrepreneurship the most among the smallest ￿rms.
For example, a 10% increase in mean establishment size is associated with a 12% reduction in
new employment growth due to startups with ￿ve workers or fewer. The same increase in average
establishment size is associated, however, with a 1% reduction in new employment growth due
to entering ￿rms with more than 100 employees. The patterns across the columns show steady
declines in elasticities as the size of new establishments increases. The impact for new ￿rms with
6-20 workers is only slightly smaller than the impact for the smallest ￿rms, while the elasticity for
entrants with 21-100 employees is 50% smaller. Larger establishments and greater concentration
are associated with a decrease in the number of smaller startups, but not a decrease in the
number of larger startups.
4We have separately con￿rmed that none of the results for new startups reported in this paper depend upon
the construction sector, where startups are over-represented in Table 1.
73 Theoretical Model
This section presents a formal treatment of entrepreneurship and industrial concentration. We
explore a range of di⁄erent explanations for the empirical observation that startup activity has
a strong negative correlation with the size of existing ￿rms. Our goal is to produce additional
testable implications of these explanations.
We develop a simple model based on monopolistic competition following the classic approach
of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Entrepreneurs create ￿rms that earn pro￿ts by selling imperfectly
substitutable goods that are produced with increasing returns to scale. The startup costs of
entrepreneurship are ￿nanced through perfectly competitive capital markets, and no contractual
frictions prevent ￿rms from pledging their future pro￿ts to ￿nanciers.
Each company operates over an in￿nite horizon and faces a constant risk of being driven
out of business by an exogenous shock, such as obsolescence of its product or the death of an
entrepreneur whose individual skills are indispensable for the operation of the ￿rm. These simple
dynamics generate a stationary equilibrium, so that we can focus on the number and size of ￿rms
and on the level of entrepreneurial activity in the steady state.
The baseline model enables us to look at the role of amenities, ￿xed costs, and pro￿tability
in explaining ￿rm creation. Several of its empirical predictions are very general: for instance,
essentially any model would predict that an exogenous increase in pro￿tability should result in
an endogenous increase in activity. An advantage of our approach is that di⁄erent elements can
easily be considered within a single standard framework. We also extend the model to address
multiple human capital levels and to allow for vertical integration.
3.1 Baseline Model
Consider a closed economy with a perfectly inelastic factor supply. There are I cities charac-
terized by their exogenous endowments of real estate Ki and by their amenity levels ai such
that ai > ai+1 for all i. There is a continuum of industries g 2 [0;G], each of which produces a
continuum of di⁄erentiated varieties.
Consumers have identical homothetic preferences de￿ned over the amenities a of their city
of residence, the amount of real estate K that they consume for housing, and their consumption
qg (￿) of each variety in each industry. Speci￿cally, we assume constant elasticity of substitution
￿ (g) > 1 across varieties in each sector and an overall Cobb-Douglas utility function












with budget shares for consumption expenditures ￿ 2 [0;1) and ￿ (g) > 0 such that
R G
0 ￿ (g)dg =
1. n(g) denotes the equilibrium number of ￿rms in each industry.
8Commodities are costlessly tradable across cities, while real estate is immobile. We assume
for simplicity that real estate is owned by developers who reside in the same city where their
property is located.5 The economy comprises measure L of workers who are perfectly mobile
across space: each supplies inelastically one unit of labor. Letting ri denote the price of real
estate and wi the wage in city i, spatial equilibrium for workers requires that
logai + logwi ￿ ￿logri = logaj + logwj ￿ ￿logrj for all i;j: (2)
naturally, cities with higher amenities (ai > ai+1) have compensatingly lower wages (wi < wi+1)
and higher rents (ri > ri+1).
Within each industry, omitting for the sake of brevity the index g, the preferences described









and the demand function for each variety
q (￿) = RP
￿￿1p(￿)
￿￿ , (4)
where R = PQ is aggregate revenue in the sector, equal to a fraction (1 ￿ ￿)￿ of total income.
Each variety ￿ is produced by a monopolistically competitive ￿rm having increasing returns
to scale. The cost function for a ￿rm locating in city i is





This speci￿cation re￿ ects a constant unit cost and an overhead requirement f > 0 that measures
the extent of economies of scale. Technology is Cobb-Douglas, with cost shares ￿ > 0 for real
estate and ￿ > 0 for labor such that ￿ + ￿ = 1. Monopolistic competition leads ￿rms to adopt















again resulting from Cobb-Douglas technology with cost shares ￿e + ￿e = 1. We assume that
the cost shares of the two factors are di⁄erent in the startup stage and in the operation of an
established ￿rm. In particular, we make the following assumption that ensures an equilibrium
sorting of ￿rms into cities, as shown in the appendix.
5Alternatively, we could allow for absentee ownership, and we would have rentiers living in extremely high-
amenity cities where no production takes place.
9Assumpition 1 Innovation is more labor intensive than production (￿e > ￿).
Relocating a ￿rm is prohibitively costly, so its location is chosen once and for all at the
moment of its creation; this rules out the presence of ￿nursery cities￿￿ la Duranton and Puga
(2001). Each ￿rm is forced out of the market in any period with a constant hazard rate ￿ 2 (0;1).
This risk implies that the stream of pro￿ts of a ￿rm must be discounted by a constant factor
to compute its present value. Thus we can assume for simplicity that the pure rate of time
preference is nil, without qualitatively a⁄ecting the results.
In a steady-state equilibrium, all ￿rms in the same sector generically choose to locate in the

































In each period and for each sector the aggregate pro￿ts of existing ￿rms coincide with the
aggregate payments to factors employed by entrepreneurs to create new varieties in the same
industry.
Firm size measured by labor employment equals
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10This condition delivers the amount of entrepreneurship in each industry. Inspection of the
condition yields two possible explanations for the connection between the number of ￿rms and
the level of entrepreneurship. Relative employment in startups and the scale of existing ￿rms
move in opposite directions due to cross-sectoral variations in economies of scale and in product
di⁄erentiation. We consider both in turn; proofs are provided in the appendix.
Proposition 1 Suppose that industries di⁄er by the degree of economies of scale f (g).
Within cities, sectors with higher economies of scale have fewer ￿rms (@n=@f < 0), higher
average employment per established ￿rm (@￿ L=@f > 0), lower average revenues per worker
(@
￿ ￿ R=￿ L
￿
=@f < 0), and a lower fraction of the work force employed by entrepreneurial star-
tups (@￿=@f < 0).
Across cities, sectors with higher economies of scale sort into cities with lower amenities,
higher wages, and a lower cost of real estate.
This proposition explains the concentration of small ￿rms, and the negative correlation be-
tween the size of existing ￿rms and the amount of entrepreneurship, on the basis of cost di⁄er-
ences across sectors. In particular, the focus is on variations in the overhead input requirement.
It is natural that sectors with higher economies of scale should have fewer, larger ￿rms in
equilibrium. Their sales per worker are lower because the labor input requirement per unit of
output is the same in all industries, but those with a higher overhead additionally need more
workers to defray their ￿xed costs. While in equilibrium the presence of fewer ￿rms implies
higher revenues per ￿rm, this does not su¢ ce to o⁄set the direct decline in sales per worker as
long as there is a positive cost of entrepreneurship.
The ￿rst part of the proposition highlights that sectors with higher ￿xed costs have not only
a smaller number of ￿rms but also a lower level of entrepreneurship. As the costs of operating a
￿rm rise, the equilibrium number of ￿rms unsurprisingly declines, and there is an accompanying
decrease in the amount of entrepreneurial activity. As the cost of opening a new establishment
rises, fewer people are interested in starting such establishments. The decrease in the steady-
state number of ￿rms entails a corresponding decline in the steady-state number of entrepreneurs,
and thus of their employees. An increase in the overhead cost induces a less than proportional
reduction in the equilibrium number of ￿rms: thus the number of workers employed in managing
existing ￿rms increases.
This leads directly to the second part of the proposition. The spatial sorting of sectors is
driven by relative factor intensities, since factor rewards move in opposite directions across cities.
For sectors with higher economies of scale, the overall factor intensity is determined more by
that of the overhead, and less by that of entrepreneurship. Innovation being the more labor-
intensive activity, sectors with lower ￿rm scale and greater innovation are consequently attracted
to high-amenity locations.
In addition or in alternative to supply-side di⁄erences, demand-side variation can also explain
why entrepreneurship and small ￿rms thrive in the same sectors.
11Proposition 2 Suppose that industries di⁄er by the degree of product substitutability ￿ (g) and
therefore by the mark-up ￿ (g)=[￿ (g) ￿ 1].
Within cities, sectors with higher product substitutability and lower mark-ups have fewer
￿rms (@n=@￿ < 0), higher average employment per established ￿rm (@￿ L=@￿ > 0), lower average
revenues per worker (@
￿ ￿ R=￿ L
￿
=@f < 0), and a lower fraction of the work force employed by
entrepreneurial startups (@￿=@￿ < 0).
Across cities, sectors with higher product substitutability and lower mark-ups sort into cities
with lower amenities, higher wages, and a lower cost of real estate.
The degree of product substitutability is the primary determinant of price markups and
pro￿t levels in this model. With CES preferences, the level of competitiveness in each sector is
entirely determined by the degree of product di⁄erentiation. If varieties are highly substitutable,
competition is intense and mark-ups are low.
The decline in mark-ups and pro￿tability makes the sector less attractive to entrepreneurs,
so fewer ￿rms enter the market. At the same time, each ￿rm must operate on high volumes
and low margins to defray its ￿xed costs. Again, in a stationary equilibrium fewer ￿rms mean
fewer startups and lower employment in innovation. On the other hand, a decrease in mark-ups
entails an inversely proportional increase in employment in direct production activities. Hence
entrepreneurship accounts for a lower share of employment.
The increase in the number of production workers also leads to lower sales per worker: the
variable labor input per unit of revenue is the inverse of the mark-up. As the latter declines,
so does the ratio of revenues to the total workforce, even if the overhead labor requirement is
constant while revenues per ￿rm rise as a consequence of the smaller equilibrium number of
￿rms.
Lower product di⁄erentiation, which leads to lower pro￿tability, implies that average factor
intensity depends mostly on production costs. Since these constitute the least labor-intensive
cost component, it follows that industries with harsher competitive conditions are particularly
keen on inexpensive real estate, and thus locate in cities with lower amenities.
Thus we have shown how the connection between ￿rm size and entrepreneurial activity
can arise from exogenous variations in the underlying parameters that characterize supply and
demand at the industry level. The same parameters can explain sorting of sectors into cities
because of the fundamental di⁄erence between mobile labor and immovable real estate.
3.2 Heterogeneous Human Capital
The model can be extended to consider human capital as another determinant of entrepreneur-
ship. Suppose that the economy is endowed with measure L of unskilled workers and H of skilled
workers, and that technology is Cobb-Douglas in the two kinds of labor and real estate. Since
both types of workers are perfectly mobile, the spatial equilibrium condition (eq. 2) implies that
12there is a single skill premium in the entire economy. Letting wi denote the wage of unskilled
workers in city i, the wage of skilled workers is hwi.
The cost function for a producer can be rewritten













with cost shares ￿e + ￿e + ￿e = 1. In equilibrium, the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers in
each industry is determined by the skill intensity of each cost component and by their relative
importance in the sector. In particular, we assume that innovation is not only the most labor-
intensive, but also the most skill-intensive activity.
Assumpition 2 Skill intensity is ranked so that ￿e=￿e > ￿=￿.
We can then establish the following result.
Proposition 3 Let industries di⁄er either by the degree of economies of scale f (g) or by the
degree of product substitutability ￿ (g). Within cities, relatively more skilled workers are then
employed in sectors with more ￿rms, lower average employment per established ￿rm, and a
higher fraction of the work force employed by entrepreneurial startups (@ (H=L)=@f < 0 and
@ (H=L)=@￿ < 0).
The proposition formalizes the intuition that entrepreneurship and entrepreneurs go together.
Since entrepreneurship is disproportionately reliant on human capital, the same industry char-
acteristics that increase entrepreneurship and reduce ￿rm size also increase the overall skill
intensity of the sector and lead it to employ a higher share of skilled workers in equilibrium.
In this model, mobility is endogenous, and workers are always in a spatial equilibrium. As
such, there is no way for endowments of human capital to lead to more entrepreneurship. To
address this type of exogenous sorting, we would need to drop the spatial equilibrium assumption
and assume that workers were either ￿xed or tied to an area by historical accident.
3.3 Vertical Integration and the Chinitz Hypothesis
A more signi￿cant extension of the model involves going beyond exogenous determinants of ￿rm
size and entrepreneurship to explain their negative correlation by an endogenous channel. In the
spirit of Chinitz, we focus on the choice of ￿rm organization. One of Chinitz￿ s core ideas was
that entrepreneurship would be higher in places that had abundant suppliers. In this model,
we endogenize the decision to integrate suppliers and examine the implications of integration
decisions on later entrepreneurship.
13In this structure, ￿rms specialize in one stage of the production process and engage in out-
sourcing if they enter a market that already hosts a number of upstream and downstream ￿rms
that could become partners for the new entrepreneur. Alternatively, if existing producers are
vertically integrated, newcomers will perceive a need to enter as an equally integrated ￿rm.
These considerations in turn a⁄ect the equilibrium level of entrepreneurship, and we show that
they also account for a link between a multitude of smaller ￿rms and higher rates of entry.
Formally, we follow Grossman and Helpman￿ s (2002) model of integration versus outsourcing
in industry equilibrium. The production process of each di⁄erentiated variety requires two stages
of production that can be carried out within an integrated ￿rm or by outsourcing. The operation

















Alternatively, ￿rms may operate as specialized producers of ￿nal goods (overhead fs) or
intermediates (overhead fm). The relationship between the two types of specialized producers
is characterized by costly search and incomplete contracts.
After overhead costs are incurred, each ￿rm must search for a partner. The probability of
￿nding one is described by a matching function that has constant returns to scale. If there are
m and s specialized intermediates and ￿nal goods producers in the market, respectively, the
probability of a match is ￿(s=m) for each specialized intermediates producer and ￿(s=m)m=s
for each specialized ￿nal goods producer. The former match rate is increasing in the ratio s=m,
while the latter is decreasing.
Once a match takes place, the two partners fully specialize to each other￿ s technology. The
intermediate goods supplier produces a quantity q (￿) of the specialized intermediate, and its unit
input requirement is ￿ times that of an integrated ￿rm. After all costs have been sunk, the two
partners bargain. The ￿nal goods producer can turn each unit of the specialized intermediate
into one unit of the ￿nal good. Otherwise, both parties have an outside option of zero due to
their complete specialization. The bargaining share of the producer of intermediates is !.




















































14Firms of all types are hit by a fatal shock with the same constant hazard rate ￿. The cost of
entrepreneurship for a specialized producer of ￿nal goods is Fs and for a specialized producer of




















which must hold with equality for integration to be an equilibrium organizational form. Gener-
ically, all ￿rms in a sector prefer the same organizational form.
Since we are interested in the e⁄ect of organizational choice on entrepreneurship through













= ￿s < 1. (23)





















On the other hand, an equilibrium in which all producers are integrated always exists, since a
single specialized producer could never ￿nd a partner to operate pro￿tably; however, it is stable
if and only if the outsourcing equilibrium does not exist.


























specialized producers of ￿nal goods.
We can therefore prove the following result.
Proposition 4 Compared to an equilibrium in which all ￿rms are vertically integrated, an equi-
librium in which all ￿rms are specialized producers (if it exists) has higher mark-ups, lower
average employment per established ￿rm, and a higher fraction of the work force employed by
entrepreneurial startups.
15This proposition establishes that di⁄erences in the equilibrium organizational form across in-
dustries can account endogenously for the correlations that we previously explained exogenously.
The pervasive presence of specialized ￿rms induces an increase in mark-ups as a direct con-
sequence of incomplete contracting. Since production costs are incurred by a partner who will
obtain only a fraction ! < 1 of revenues in ex-post bargaining, output is proportionally lower,
and the mark-up is 1=! times the one charged by an integrated ￿rm. The reduction in the
average size of each ￿rm is also intuitive: outsourcing tends to increase the number of ￿rms both
by separating stages of production and by reducing ￿xed costs for each ￿rm.
Most important, outsourcing also yields an increase in entrepreneurship, spurred by the
opportunity of matching with a complementary specialized producer. Many entrepreneurs are
employed in creating ￿rms to enter the matching market. However, not all are matched in
equilibrium, and the output of those that are is reduced by contracting frictions. This implies
that the share of workers allocated to entry, as opposed to actual production, is higher than
under vertical integration.
The equilibrium mode of organizational form is independent of location, since it is not a
function of factor rewards. In fact, equilibrium selection is mostly determined by parameters
speci￿c to the integration decision. Outsourcing is obviously more likely when it involves greater
cost reductions (￿m, ￿s, and ￿ are low). Its likelihood is ￿rst increasing and then decreasing in
! on (0;1), which is intuitive since both types of specialized producers must have incentives to
enter the market in order for outsourcing to be sustainable.
The only parameter that a⁄ects both the properties of the baseline equilibrium with vertical
integration and the likelihood of outsourcing is the elasticity of substitution ￿. While its e⁄ect
is not unambiguous, the following case is of particular interest.
Proposition 5 If log(￿=!) > 1 then outsourcing is more likely in sectors with a low elasticity
of substitution (￿) for any matching function ￿(:) having constant returns to scale.
Changes in ￿ have two opposite e⁄ects. On the one hand, greater substitutability reduces
the number m of ￿rms that enter as specialized producers of intermediates and increases the
probability that each of them successfully ￿nds a match: this unambiguously favours outsourcing.
On the other hand, for ￿ > ! outsourcing is so ine¢ cient in the ￿nal stage of production that
vertically integrated ￿rms would charge lower prices: this tends to make them prevail when
competition is tougher. For a su¢ ciently high value of the ratio ￿=!, the latter e⁄ects is certain
to dominate.
In this case, the results of proposition 2 are reinforced by the endogenous channel of ￿rm
organization. In particular, cities with higher amenity levels attract industries that are more
likely to have an equilibrium with pervasive outsourcing, which are precisely the sectors that
tend to have more numerous and smaller ￿rms and a higher rate of entrepreneurship.
164 Origins of Entrepreneurial Clusters
We turn now to empirical evidence on the origins of clusters of entrepreneurship. We ￿rst
consider the explanation that there exist very high returns to entrepreneurship in certain regions
and industries. We then examine cost factors. Finally, we present empirical evidence on the
model￿ s sorting predictions regarding amenities, human capital, and clusters of entrepreneurship.
Throughout these exercises, we are assessing in part whether these forces can explain the small
establishment size e⁄ect documented in Section 2.
4.1 High Returns Rationales
We ￿rst test whether returns to entrepreneurship and production are higher in places with
smaller ￿rms and abundant employment growth. Section 3￿ s model characterizes this channel
through the elasticity of substitution. Alternatively, the returns to entrepreneurship may be uni-
form spatially. This scenario would suggest that the strong correlation between initial industry
structure and subsequent employment growth due to startups descends more from a reduction
in the costs of entrepreneurship or supply side factors.
Table 4 presents evidence on these hypotheses. We calculate from the base Censuses (e.g.,
Census of Manufacturers, Census of Retail Trade) the 1997 dollar value of shipments per worker
by region-industry separately for single-unit ￿rms and multi-unit ￿rms. We use this shipments
per employee metric as a proxy for pro￿tability, subject to including industry FEs that control
for industry-level production techniques, and therefore the returns to entrepreneurship.
Columns 1 and 2 model log shipments per worker among single-unit ￿rms as the dependent
variable, while the last two columns consider the similar measure among multi-unit establish-
ments. Column 1 does not ￿nd a strong relationship between average establishment size in
1992 of the region-industry and the value per worker subsequently evident in 1997. This weak
explanatory power is both in economic magnitudes and in statistical signi￿cance. There is some
evidence of greater initial employment in region-industries with high subsequent returns. This
could be evidence for an agglomeration e⁄ect or just that there is more employment in places
where the returns to that employment are higher.
The limited evidence for abnormal subsequent shipments per worker also extends in Column 2
to the industry concentration measure. Likewise, the third and fourth columns ￿nd even weaker
relationships when instead considering the labor returns among establishments of multi-unit
￿rms. The appendix repeats these estimations by sector. Very weak relationships are evident
in all sectors including manufacturing, where the average establishment size e⁄ect is strongest
in Figures 2a and 2b. These patterns suggest that abnormal returns are not the driving force
behind the observed relationships. Instead, the results point us to theories that emphasize either
an abundance of entrepreneurial types in the area or a reduction in the costs of entrepreneurship.
As a second test, Table 5 also veri￿es that the observed average size relationship is not
17due to product cycles and industry evolution.6 We calculate from the LBD the average age of
establishments by region-industry with a cap at 15 years and older. The ￿rst column of Table 5
con￿rms that industry-regions with older establishments in 1992 have less entrepreneurship over
the ensuing eight years. The second and third columns show, however, that this age regressor
does little to explain the relationship between entry and initial average establishment size. The
coe¢ cients are very close to those reported in Table 2, and the same holds for facility expansions
in the latter three columns. Thus, while entrepreneurship is closely linked to region-industry
evolution, this cannot explain the small establishment e⁄ect.7
4.2 Lower Cost Rationales
We next evaluate cost factors. Tables 6A and 6B ￿rst examine industrial structures in metropol-
itan areas for an indirect test. Table 6A focuses on mean establishment size, while Table 6B
considers HHI concentration. In both tables, the ￿rst two columns consider startup entry, while
the last two columns consider facility expansions. Our data include 273 cities and 66 SIC2
industries. We move to the SIC2 level when considering city-industry combinations to reduce
the number of zero-valued observations. Even at the more aggregated industry level, however,
not all city-industries are present, which results in 16,363 observations. The other details of the
regressions remain as before.
Column 1 only includes industry FEs so that we can consider the correlation between em-
ployment growth due to startups and city-level characteristics. This regression shows that the
large negative e⁄ect of greater average establishment size that is evident regionally is also evi-
dent by city-industry. A 10% increase in the mean 1992 establishment size of a city-industry is
associated with an 8% reduction in employment growth due to startups over the ensuing eight
years.
Returning to Chinitz￿ s comparison of manufacturing in New York City and Pittsburgh, aver-
age establishment size is 0.37 log points higher in Pittsburgh than in New York in the LBD (45.9
employees versus 31.6). Our coe¢ cient estimates suggest that this establishment size di⁄erence
accounts for a -0.3 log point reduction in Pittsburgh￿ s startup employment growth relative to
New York in manufacturing. This small establishment e⁄ect represents a quarter of the di⁄er-
ence in manufacturing entry between these two cities once population di⁄erences are accounted
for.
We also ￿nd a sizable and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient on the average establishment
size in the city as a whole. Holding a local industry￿ s own establishment size constant, entrepre-
neurship increases when the surrounding city has greater numbers of small establishments. The
coe¢ cients on initial employments are large and of similar magnitude to the mean establishment
6For example, Faberman (2007), Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994), and Klepper and Graddy (1990).
7Unreported estimations further disaggregate the average age e⁄ect. The negative e⁄ect for startup entry is
particularly concentrated in the presence of many establishments of greater than ten years in age.
18size, but with opposite signs. This pattern suggests that the employment growth of new star-
tups is quite closely correlated to the number of existing establishments in the area. Column 2
includes city FEs. In this case, the coe¢ cient on average establishment size falls to -0.67, and
growth is not quite one-for-one with existing employment in the conditional estimation.
Columns 3 and 4 look at expansions of existing businesses. The impact of average establish-
ment size in the city-industry remains robustly negative but is smaller than for startups. The
role of initial employment in the city-industry is also quite similar to the ￿rst two columns. The
biggest change is that the city-level mean establishment size has a weakly positive impact on
employment growth. These patterns support the view that small, decentralized suppliers and
customers are more helpful or important for new startups than for expansions of established
￿rms. In a related study, Glaeser and Kerr (2009) reach a similar conclusion when exploiting
more direct inter-industry linkages within the manufacturing sector.
As a second and more direct approach, Table 7 examines the relationship between labor
intensity and entrepreneurship rates. The model suggests a connection between higher labor in-
tensity, lower ￿xed costs, and more entrepreneurship. Indeed, we believe that labor intensity is a
reasonable proxy for lower overhead costs of running a ￿rm, which should make entrepreneurship
easier.8 Panel B of Table 7 shows that labor intensity at the region-industry level strongly pre-
dicts subsequent entry among startups, which supports that prediction of the model. However,
controlling for labor intensity does not substantially diminish the average establishment size
e⁄ect. Thus, while entry costs are clearly important, the relationship between initial industry
structure and subsequent entrepreneurship is not due to di⁄ering factor intensities.
4.3 Sort Rationales: Amenities
The model featured one fundamental city-level attribute￿ the level of amenities. Better ameni-
ties drive up the price of land, attracting low ￿xed cost industries that tend to have higher
levels of entrepreneurship. We start with these implications of the model and then ask whether
amenity variables, or any others, can explain the strong connection between average establish-
ment size and new establishment formation. While there are certainly many man-made local
amenities, we focus on predetermined climate amenities that can be taken as exogenous. We
collect city-level data on coastal access, January temperature, July temperature, snowfall, and
precipitation. While all of these variables can impact both production and consumption, they
seem likely to primarily impact consumer well-being rather than the e¢ ciency of ￿rms.9
We consolidate these variables into a single amenity index by using a housing price hedonic
regression that is reported in the appendix. We regress the log average housing price in the
metropolitan area in 1990 on these climate variables. Our primary speci￿cation uses just the log
8The results of proposition 1 would be unchanged if we assumed formally that the overhead is less labor
intensive than the unit input coe¢ cient.
9See Carlino and Saiz (2007), Chen and Rosenthal (2008), Gabriel and Rosenthal (2004), Glaeser et al. (2001),
and Rosenthal and Ross (this issue).
19of each explanatory variable, and we have con￿rmed that we deliver very similar results using
a piecewise linear function that is also reported in the appendix. The explanatory power of the
two speci￿cations are quite similar. The San Francisco Bay Area and Los Angeles are typically
found to have the nicest consolidated amenities, while Little Rock, AR, and Tulsa, OK, are
judged to have the weakest amenities.
A number of studies consider the productivity bene￿ts that natural advantages can o⁄er.10
The appendix also documents how this amenities index is mostly uncorrelated or negatively
correlated with productive natural advantages like the cost of electricity or coal, the availability
of farmland, and the availability of timberland across states. This suggests that our constructed
amenities index is unlikely to be re￿ ecting production-related bene￿ts to entrepreneurship.
Following the model, we look at the interaction between amenities and the degree of labor
intensity in the industry. Labor intensity is de￿ned as the ratio between total payroll of the
establishment and total shipments. In the model, this variable also captured the degree to
which the industry was dependent on real estate or other inputs that become more expensive
in high amenity places. As such, the model predicted that labor intensive industries would
particularly locate in high amenity areas.
Table 8 examines the relationship between this amenity index and both employment and en-
trepreneurship. The ￿rst two regressions consider industrial specialization across cities. Column
1 regresses log total employment by city-industry on the city￿ s amenity index, the industry￿ s
labor intensity, and their interaction. Variables are demeaned prior to interaction to restore
main e⁄ects. There is a strong positive correlation between the amenity index and the overall
level of employment in the metropolitan area. High amenity places generally attract people and
￿rms. Labor intensive industries are also generally larger in size. The interaction of ameni-
ties and labor intensity is strongly positive, implying that more labor intensive industries are
disproportionately located in high amenity cities. The model￿ s predicted pattern of industrial
specialization is thus generally supported and persists in Column 2￿ s conditional estimations.
Columns 3 to 5 consider employment growth due to startup entry as the outcome measure.
The coe¢ cient on city-level amenities remains positive and quite signi￿cant, even after control-
ling for initial employment in the city-industry. When we do not control for initial employment,
the coe¢ cient on the amenity index more than doubles in size. This simple association likely
captures elements of regional growth and entrepreneurship in nice places. A related literature
also considers how higher home prices can encourage entrepreneurship by easing liquidity con-
straints.11
While the raw e⁄ect of amenities is quite positive, we do not ￿nd that the interaction works
in the expected direction. There is a weak negative relationship between the interaction and
employment growth due to startups. As would be expected, this negative e⁄ect ￿ ips sign when
10See Ellison and Glaeser (1999), Ellison et al. (2009), Glaeser and Kerr (2009), Holmes and Lee (2009), and
Rosenthal and Strange (2001).
11For example, Black et al. (1996), Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Hurst and Lusardi (2004), and Nanda (2009).
20we do not control for initial employment in the city-industry. The interaction becomes smaller in
magnitude and statistically insigni￿cant in the fourth regression that includes city and industry
FEs. Thus, while the spatial sorting follows the model￿ s predictions, there does not appear to
be an additional premium for entrepreneurship.
Column 5 further includes average establishment size as a control in the speci￿cation with
industry and city FEs. The conditional framework does little to change the estimated interaction
e⁄ect, but the interaction also does little to diminish the establishment size e⁄ect. The measured
elasticity is essentially identical to that estimated in Table 6A. As a result, we conclude that the
small establishment size e⁄ect extends beyond the sorting of labor intensive industries into high
amenity areas.
Columns 6 and 7 examine the connection between amenities and employment growth due
to entry of establishments that are part of existing ￿rms. The raw e⁄ect of amenities in this
regression is still positive, although it is small. The small coe¢ cient on amenities re￿ ects the
fact that we are controlling for initial employment. Without that control, the amenity measure
has a large coe¢ cient of 0.8. In this case, the interaction is positive but statistically insigni￿cant.
In the seventh regression, we include city and industry FEs and the interaction again is positive.
The last column includes log of average establishment size in the city industry as a control. Again,
the control does little to our estimated coe¢ cients, and the control remains similar in magnitude
to that estimated in Table 6A. The establishment size e⁄ect is not due to the industrial sorting
considered here.
Table 8 shows a robust relationship between the amenity index and both employment and
employment growth. It is also true that the amenity index has a greater e⁄ect on employment
levels in labor intensive industries. However, amenities do not have a signi￿cantly greater impact
on growth for more labor intensive industries. There is a slight positive interaction e⁄ect for
facility expansions and a slight negative e⁄ect for startups.
4.4 Sort Rationales: Human Capital
In the model, amenities are an exogenous force that shifts the supply of entrepreneurs across
space. We now look at the share of the city￿ s population with college degrees. The spatial
human capital distribution in the model is endogenously determined through sorting, yet there
is certainly abundant evidence suggesting that education patterns are quite permanent across
places. Treating the distribution of educated workers as exogenous is a natural half-way point
towards treating the supply of entrepreneurs as an outside force. If the educated share of the
population in a city is reasonably ￿xed, and if educated workers are particularly intensively used
in entrepreneurship especially in high human capital industries, then this supply of entrepreneurs
could also explain the establishment size e⁄ect.12
12Carlino and Hunt (2007), for example, emphasize the role of local human capital in explaining the geography
of invention. See also Buenstorf and Klepper (2007), Doms et al. (this issue), and Marx et al. (2007).
21In the ￿rst two regressions of Table 9, we examine again industry employment. We include
both the amenity index and the share of the city￿ s population with college degrees as control
variables. The coe¢ cient on the amenity index falls signi￿cantly when we control for education
levels, perhaps re￿ ecting that amenities increase employment in part by attracting more educated
people. We also ￿nd that there is a positive interaction between both variables and the education
intensity of the industry, as measured by the share of the industry￿ s workforce with college degrees
at the national level. Unsurprisingly, industries that depend upon college workers locate in cities
with many college workers. Such industries also locate in cities rich with amenities. The second
regression includes city and industry FEs and continues to ￿nd this industrial specialization.
The third and fourth regressions use the employment growth due to startups as the depen-
dent variable. We control for initial employment and average establishment size. Column 3
￿nds that places with more educated workforces have more startup growth, especially in indus-
tries that depend upon college-educated workers. While educated workers are associated with
entrepreneurship, this does not meaningfully explain the average establishment size e⁄ect. The
fourth column includes industry and city FEs. Again, the interaction between city education
levels and the college share in the industry remains signi￿cant, but there is little impact on the
estimated establishment size e⁄ect.
In the last two regressions, we consider employment growth due to a¢ liated new establish-
ments. In that case, we ￿nd a positive interaction between the college share of the industry and
both city-level amenities and human capital for explaining entry. Industries dependent upon
college workers are expanding in places with many educated workers and in places with good
weather. However, once again this sorting does not explain the establishment size e⁄ect.
5 Conclusion
The connection between small average establishment size and subsequent employment growth
through startups is remarkably robust. It is strongest for manufacturing but present to some
degree for startups in all sectors. This e⁄ect does not re￿ ect industrial sorting on its own nor
city-level omitted variables. Moreover, it is con￿rmed by the complementary study of Rosenthal
and Strange (2009). However, we remain unsure about whether this correlation represents some
causal link between small establishment size and entry or whether it re￿ ects omitted variables
that explain both outcomes.
The evidence on shipments per worker suggests that the returns to production are probably
comparable, rather than higher, in city-industries with lots of small establishments. This fact
pushes us away from theories that emphasize abnormal returns to production and towards the-
ories that emphasize lower costs of entrepreneurship or greater supplies of entrepreneurs. We
likewise con￿rm that the small establishment e⁄ect is not due to industry evolution, product cy-
cles, and mean establishment age, although each of these is individually important for explaining
22entry.
There is evidence that supports the view that entrepreneurship is more common when its
costs are lower. For example, the connection between labor intensity and entrepreneurship
suggests that large ￿xed costs deter entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship is also higher when
suppliers are independent (see also Glaeser and Kerr, 2009). Yet, these factors explain little of
the connection between entrepreneurship and small establishment size.
We are left with two explanations for the connection between small establishments and
subsequent ￿rm births: lower ￿xed costs and a greater supply of entrepreneurs. Our variables
capturing lower ￿xed costs, after all, may only capture a tiny amount of true cost di⁄erentials
across space. This would lead us to underestimate its importance. Alternatively, Chinitz￿ s
argument that some places just have a greater supply of entrepreneurs may hold.
Yet theories that emphasize the supply of entrepreneurs face both empirical and theoretical
challenges. The theoretical challenge, which is the less onerous one, is to craft models where
entrepreneurs are formed by some local variable and face limited mobility. While neither feature
is standard in spatial models, it is relatively straightforward to imagine ways of perturbing those
models to incorporate those features that would not break with the core traditions of spatial
economics.
The empirical challenge is harder. To show the importance of the supply of entrepreneurship,
there must be well-measured exogenous variables that capture and drive entrepreneurship supply.
Certainly, our work illustrates that using broad-brush measures like overall education levels is
likely to be insu¢ cient. Yet, despite the di¢ culties of this challenge, we suspect that there is
truth to Chinitz￿ s hypothesis and that at least some of the connection between small ￿rms and
subsequent employment growth re￿ ects heterogeneity in the supply of entrepreneurs.
23A Appendix
A.1 Equilibrium Sorting
In equilibrium, the expected value of entrepreneurship in sector g (whose mention we omit for






































































































￿1￿￿ and ni ￿ 0 for all i (A4)
with complementary slackness.
This condition has the intuitive consequence that in equilibrium a city can only have more
expensive real estate if it has a lower wage, or else it would not be rational for any industry to
locate there. Thus we can order cities so that wi < wi+1 and ri > ri+1. The spatial-indi⁄erence
condition for individuals (eq. 2) implies that this is the ordering of locations by decreasing
amenity, ai > ai+1.
If sectors can also be ordered by increasing economies of scale (f0 (g) > 0) or increasing
product substitutability (￿0 (g) > 0), then in equilibrium they correspondingly sort into cities
provided that some conditions on the relative factor intensity of di⁄erent cost components are
satis￿ed.
Lemma 1 Suppose that industries di⁄er by the degree of economies of scale f (g). Consider two
cities i and j such that ri < rj and wi > wj. If ￿rms in sector ￿ g are located in city i, then no ￿rms
in sectors with higher economies of scale than ￿ g locate in city j (f (g) > f (￿ g) ) nj (g) = 0).
If ￿rms in sector ￿ g are located in city j, then no ￿rms in sectors with lower economies of scale
than ￿ g locate in city i (f (g) < f (￿ g) ) ni (g) = 0).
Proof. The equilibrium condition implies that
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Lemma 2 Suppose that industries di⁄er by the degree of product substitutability ￿ (g). Consider
two cities i and j such that ri < rj and wi > wj. If ￿rms in sector ￿ g are located in city i, then
no ￿rms in sectors with higher product substitutability than ￿ g locate in city j (￿ (g) > ￿ (￿ g) )
nj (g) = 0). If ￿rms in sector ￿ g are located in city j, then no ￿rms in sectors with lower product
substitutability than ￿ g locate in city i (￿ (g) < ￿ (￿ g) ) ni (g) = 0).
Proof. The equilibrium condition implies that

































































































) ni (g) = 0.

























































































If nj (￿ g) > 0, suppose that there exists a sector ^ g such that ni (^ g) > 0 but ￿ (^ g) < ￿ (￿ g). The
proof above then implies that nj (￿ g) = 0, a contradiction. Thus if ni (￿ g) > 0 then nj (g) = 0 for
all g such that ￿ (g) < ￿ (￿ g).
For any cities i and j, there can be no more than one sector whose ￿rms are located in both.
For any cities i, j, and k with ai > aj > ak, there can be no sector whose ￿rms are located in i
and k but not in j, or else no sector would locate in j. Moreover, with a continuum of sectors,
none can be located in more than two cities, or else one city would need to host only a single
non-measurable sector, which would be insu¢ cient to employ the city￿ s endowment of immobile
real estate.
Ordering cities so that ai > ai+1 and sectors so that f0 (g) > 0 or ￿0 (g) > 0, these lemmas
imply that in equilibrium ￿rms in sectors g 2 [￿ gi￿1; ￿ gi] locate in city i, where ￿ g0 = 0 and ￿ gI = G,
while the remaining I ￿ 1 thresholds ￿ gi are endogenously determined. Generically, sectors are
located in a single city, with at most a non-measurable set of I ￿ 1 industries having ￿rms in
two cities.


























￿ = 1 for all i > 1, (A5)
where it is understood that either ￿0 (g) > 0 and f0 (g) = 0 or ￿0 (g) = 0 and f0 (g) > 0.
For each city i and each sector g 2 (￿ gi￿1; ￿ gi], aggregate factor payments satisfy
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
riK (g) =
"




































can be normalized to unity.
Considering that a fraction ￿ of income in city i is spent on ￿nal consumption of real estate
in the same city, the full-employment condition for real estate is
(1 ￿ ￿)riKi =
Z ￿ gi
￿ gi￿1
[riK (g) + ￿wiL(g)]dg for all i, (A8)





Recalling the spatial equilibrium condition for workers (eq. 2), the equilibrium is character-
ized by a system of 3I ￿1 equations in as many unknowns: the I ￿1 cuto⁄s ￿ gi and the 2I factor
rewards (ri;wi):
8
> > > > > > > > > > > <





































































A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The sorting of industries into cities has been proved by lemma 1, which also establishes that all
￿rms in the same sector generically locate in the same city.
















￿2 < 0; (A11)
































￿￿ei2 < 0; (A13)















A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The sorting of industries into cities has been proved by lemma 2, which also establishes that all
￿rms in the same sector generically locate in the same city.













￿ < 0; (A15)



















































￿￿ei2 < 0; (A17)
















A.4 Proof of Proposition 3































i h￿ (￿e ￿ ￿) + ￿￿
, (A19)
which is decreasing in f and in ￿ if and only if ￿e=￿e > ￿=￿.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4









28where the right-hand side is the mark-up in an equilibrium with pervasive integration. Firm size


















< ￿ L (A21)
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A.6 Proof of Proposition 5









which is satis￿ed if, but not only if, log(￿=!) > 1.
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Figure 2a:  Start-Up Elasticity to Average Establishment Size by Sector
Notes:  Figure reports elasticity estimates of log entry employment by sector over 1992-1999 to log average establishment size in 1992.  A negative elasticity 
means greater entry is associated with smaller establishments in the incumbent industrial structure.  Regressions employ region-industry variation, include 
region and industry fixed effects, and control for log initial employment in region-industry.  Squares represent point estimates, and end points provide two 


















Figure 2b:  Facility Expansion Elasticity to Average Est. Size by Sector
Notes: See Figure 2a.  Figure considers entry of expansion establishments by multi-unit firms instead of start-up entry.All Establishments Facility
Entering  of New Expansions
Establishments Startup Firms of Existing Firms
Mean Annual Entry Counts 704,784 564,024 140,761
Mean Annual Entry Employment 7,259,444 3,819,081 3,440,362
Mean Annual Entry Size 10.3 6.8 24.4
Entry Counts by Entry Size
    1-5 Employees 70% 77% 44%
    6-20 Employees 22% 19% 35%
    21-100 Employees 7% 4% 17%
    101+ Employees 1% 1% 4%
Entry Counts by Sector
    Mining 0% 0% 0%
    Construction 10% 13% 1%
    Manufacturing 5% 5% 3%
    Transportation & Utilities 5% 5% 7%
    Wholesale Trade 8% 8% 9%
    Retail Trade 24% 23% 32%
    Finance, Ins., & Real Estate 10% 8% 18%
    Services 37% 39% 30%
Entry Counts by Region
    Northeast 18% 19% 17%
    South 36% 36% 38%
    Midwest 22% 21% 23%
    West Coast 24% 24% 23%
Notes:  Descriptive statistics for entering establishments in the Longitudinal Business Database from 1992-1998.  
Jarmin and Miranda (2002) describe the construction of the LBD.  Sectors not included are agriculture, forestry 
and fishing, public administration, the US postal service, and private households.
Table 1:  LBD Descriptive Statistics on US Entry RatesStartup Startup Startup Facility Facility Facility
Entry Entry Entry Expansions Expansions Expansions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log 1992 Total Employment 0.972 0.810 0.968 1.105 0.943 1.096
in Region-Industry (0.010) (0.036) (0.009) (0.016) (0.057) (0.016)
Log 1992 Av. Establishment -0.674 -0.638 -0.633 -0.432 -0.340 -0.317
Size in Region-Industry (0.013) (0.046) (0.020) (0.030) (0.125) (0.026)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.83 0.93 0.72 0.89
Region Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X
Estimation Technique OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
Log 1992 Total Employment 0.634 0.475 0.511 0.905 0.754 0.826
in Region-Industry (0.020) (0.030) (0.023) (0.031) (0.060) (0.027)
Log 1992 HHI Concentration -0.418 -0.167 -0.597 -0.243 -0.120 -0.359
in Region-Industry (0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.025)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.77 0.93 0.70 0.89
Region Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X
Estimation Technique OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
Notes:  Estimations quantify the relationship between entry and industrial structure.  The dependent variables are log entry 
employments of new firms or facility expansions by region-industry taken from the LBD.  Entry employments are annual 
averages for region-industries over the 1992-1999 period.  Regions are classified by the nine Census regions, and industries 
are classified at the SIC3 level (349 in total).  The explanatory variables of total employments, average establishment size, 
and concentration are calculated from initial values in 1992 by region-industry.  The region with the least industry 
employment is excluded for each industry in both OLS and IV specifications.  IV regressions instrument for observed region-
industry average establishment size or concentration with the 1992 level in the excluded region by industry.  The first stage 
relationships are 0.925 (0.020) and 0.731 (0.011), respectively.  Estimations report clustered standard errors, are unweighted, 
and have 2,712 observations.  The decline in observations from the theoretical level of 2,792 is due to cases where an 
industry is not present in every region.  Weighted regressions employing 1992 industry sizes as weights produce similar 
results.  The appendix reports these regressions by sector.
Table 2:  Entry Rates and Regional Industrial Structure
Dep. Variable is Log Average Employment in Entering
Establishments over 1992-1999 by Region-Industry
A.  Entry and Average Establishment Size
B. Entry and HHI Concentration IndexTotal
Entry 1-5 6-20 21-100 101+
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log 1992 Total Employment 0.972 0.915 0.910 0.916 1.011
in Region-Industry (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.028)
Log 1992 Av. Establishment -0.674 -1.223 -0.963 -0.476 -0.014
Size in Region-Industry (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.026)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.83 0.87 0.85 0.75 0.51
Region Fixed Effects X X X X X
Log 1992 Total Employment 0.634 0.326 0.416 0.682 1.088
in Region-Industry (0.020) (0.033) (0.025) (0.012) (0.037)
Log 1992 HHI Concentration -0.418 -0.724 -0.614 -0.288 0.113
in Region-Industry (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.017) (0.019)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.77 0.68 0.74 0.71 0.51
Region Fixed Effects X X X X X
Notes:  See Table 2.  Estimations quantify the relationship between entry and industrial structure across the entry size 
distribution.  Entering employments are for the first year of establishment observation. 
Table 3:  Entry Size Distribution and Regional Industrial Structure
Entering Employment Of
Dep. Variable is Log Average Employment in Entering
B.  Entry and HHI Concentration Index
Establishments over 1992-1999 by Region-Industry
A.  Entry and Average Establishment Size(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log 1992 Total Employment 0.055 0.041 0.044 0.065
in Region-Industry (0.025) (0.009) (0.015) (0.017)
Log 1992 Av. Establishment -0.030 0.042
Size in Region-Industry (0.044) (0.026)
Log 1992 HHI Concentration -0.004 0.010
in Region-Industry (0.013) (0.014)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.83 0.83 0.89 0.89
Region Fixed Effects X X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X X
Table 4:  Labor Returns and Regional Industrial Structure
Dep. Variable is Log 1997 Dollar Value of Shipments
Over Employee Count by Region-Industry
Notes:  See Table 2.  Estimations quantify the relationship between future industry returns to labor and 
industrial structure.  The dependent variables are log dollar value of shipments in 1997 divided by employee 
counts.  The appendix reports these regressions by sector.
Labor Returns and Regional Industry Structure
Log 1997 Labor Returns
in Single-Unit Firms in
Region-Industry
Log 1997 Labor Returns
in Multi-Unit Firms in
Region-IndustryStartup Startup Startup Facility Facility Facility
Entry Entry Entry Expansions Expansions Expansions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log 1992 Total Employment 0.578 0.804 0.522 0.847 0.981 0.806
in Region-Industry (0.031) (0.039) (0.029) (0.053) (0.047) (0.057)
Log 1992 Mean Establish. -0.527 -0.439 -0.558 -0.598 -0.553 -0.621
Age in Region-Industry (0.142) (0.119) (0.136) (0.161) (0.180) (0.163)
Log 1992 Av. Establishment -0.619 -0.317
Size in Region-Industry (0.040) (0.124)
Log 1992 HHI Concentration -0.173 -0.126
in Region-Industry (0.023) (0.029)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.89 0.89 0.89
Region Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Table 5:  Entry Rates and Regional Industry Age Distribution
Dep. Variable is Log Average Employment in Entering
Establishments over 1992-1999 by Region-Industry
Notes:  See Table 2.  Estimations quantify the relationship between entry and mean age of establishments by region-industry.Startup Startup Facility Facility
Entry Entry Expansions Expansions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log 1992 Total Employment 0.237 0.335
in City (0.012) (0.016)
Log 1992 Total Employment 0.860 0.794 0.779 0.755
in City-Industry (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.018)
Log 1992 Av. Establishment -0.283 0.106
Size in City (0.040) (0.053)
Log 1992 Av. Establishment -0.802 -0.673 -0.553 -0.470
Size in City-Industry (0.019) (0.021) (0.024) (0.027)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.87 0.88 0.80 0.81
City Fixed Effects X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X X
Table 6A:  Entry Rates and City-Level Industrial Structure
Establishments over 1992-1999 by City-Industry
Notes:  Estimations quantify the relationship between entry and city-level industrial structure.  The 
dependent variables are log entry employments of new firms or facility expansions by city-industry taken 
from the LBD.  Entry employments are annual averages for city-industries over the 1992-1999 period.  
Cities are classified by 273 PMSAs excluding AK and HI, and industries are classified at the SIC2 level (66 
in total).  The explanatory variables of total employments, average establishment size, and concentration are 
calculated from initial values in 1992 by city-industry.  Estimations report robust standard errors, are 
unweighted, and have 16,363 observations.  The decline in observations from the theoretical level of 18,018 
is due to cases where an industry is not present in every city.  Weighted regressions employing an interaction 
of average industry size across cities with average size of industries within a city as weights produce similar 
results.
Dep. Variable is Log Average Employment in Entering
Entry and Average Establishment SizeStartup Startup Facility Facility
Entry Entry Expansions Expansions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log 1992 Total Employment 0.402 0.472
in City (0.011) (0.014)
Log 1992 Total Employment 0.364 0.383 0.438 0.471
in City-Industry (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011)
Log 1992 HHI Concentration -0.092 -0.071
in City (0.009) (0.011)
Log 1992 HHI Concentration -0.273 -0.223 -0.159 -0.134
in City-Industry (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.86 0.87 0.80 0.81
City Fixed Effects X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X X
Table 6B:  Entry Rates and City-Level Industrial Structure
Dep. Variable is Log Average Employment in Entering
Establishments over 1992-1999 by City-Industry
Notes:  See Table 6A.
Entry and HHI Concentration IndexStartup Startup Facility Facility
Entry Entry Expansions Expansions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log 1992 Total Employment 0.913 0.910 1.075 1.074
in Region-Industry (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016)
Log 1992 Labor Intensity 0.377 0.536 -0.202 -0.178
in Region-Industry (0.040) (0.034) (0.041) (0.027)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.70 0.68
Region Fixed Effects X X X X
Estimation Technique OLS IV OLS IV
Log 1992 Total Employment 0.966 0.961 1.111 1.103
in Region-Industry (0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.016)
Log 1992 Labor Intensity 0.274 0.317 -0.272 -0.300
in Region-Industry (0.030) (0.037) (0.036) (0.034)
Log 1992 Av. Establishment -0.659 -0.612 -0.446 -0.336
Size in Region-Industry (0.011) (0.018) (0.031) (0.027)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.83 0.73
Region Fixed Effects X X X X
Estimation Technique OLS IV OLS IV
Table 7:  Entry Rates and Industry Labor Intensity
Dep. Variable is Log Average Employment in Entering
Establishments over 1992-1999 by Region-Industry
Notes:  See Table 2.  Estimations quantify the relationship between entry and industry labor intensity.  
Labor intensity is measured as payroll divided by total sales.  The region with the least industry 
employment is excluded for each industry in both OLS and IV specifications.  IV regressions instrument 
for observed region-industry labor intensity with the 1992 intensity in the excluded region by industry.  
The first stage relationship is 0.815 (0.014).  
B. Labor Intensity and Regional Industrial Structure
A. Labor Intensity OnlyTotal Total Startup Startup Startup Facility Facility Facility
Employment Employment Entry Entry Entry Expansions Expansions Expansions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
City-Level Amenities 0.964 0.489 0.212
(0.076) (0.035) (0.043)
Industry Labor Intensity 0.813 0.461 -0.352
(0.035) (0.016) (0.018)
City-Level Amenities x 0.293 0.293 -0.129 -0.043 -0.128 0.053 0.128 0.069
Industry Labor Intensity (0.147) (0.057) (0.065) (0.041) (0.039) (0.069) (0.046) (0.046)
Log 1992 Total Employment 0.763 0.408 0.789 0.824 0.484 0.746
in City-Industry (0.005) (0.009) (0.013) (0.006) (0.011) (0.018)
Log 1992 Av. Establishment -0.669 -0.460
Size in Region-Industry (0.021) (0.027)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.04 0.81 0.66 0.87 0.88 0.58 0.81 0.81
City Fixed Effects X X X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X X X
Table 8:  Amenities, Industry Location, and Entrepreneurship
Dependent Variable is Log Employment in Indicated Type of Establishment over 1992-1999 by City-Industry
Notes:  Estimations quantify the relationships among city amenities, industry labor intensity, industry location, and entrepreneurship.  The dependent variables in columns 1 and 2 
are log employments by city-industry taken from the LBD.  These specifications describe industrial location patterns.  The dependent variables in columns 3-8 are log entry 
employments of new firms or facility expansions by city-industry.  These specifications describe subsequent entrepreneurship rates.  Entry employments are annual averages for 
city-industries over the 1992-1999 period.  Average entry of less than one worker is recoded as one worker for these estimations.  Cities are classified by 273 PMSAs excluding 
AK and HI, and industries are classified at the SIC2 level (66 in total).  City-level amenities are calculated through 1990 housing prices and climate variables as described in the 
text and appendix.  Industry labor intensity is measured as payroll divided by total sales.  Total employments are calculated from initial values in 1992 by city-industry.  
Explanatory variables are demeaned prior to interaction to restore main effects.  Estimations report robust standard errors and are unweighted.  Columns 1 and 2 have 18,018 
observations.  Columns 3-8 have 16,363 observations after dropping city-industries where no initial employment existed.  Weighted regressions employing an interaction of 
average industry size across cities with average size of industries within a city as weights produce similar results.Total Total Startup Startup Facility Facility
Employment Employment Entry Entry Expansions Expansions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
City-Level Amenities 0.972 0.158 -0.038
(0.225) (0.027) (0.042)
City-Level Bachelors' Share 2.250 0.269 0.388
in 1990 (0.178) (0.024) (0.035)
Industry Share of Workers 0.440 -0.223 -0.075
with Bachelors' Education (0.030) (0.011) (0.018)
City-Level Amenities x 0.199 0.199 0.049 0.052 0.271 0.287
Industry Bach. Intensity (0.125) (0.052) (0.042) (0.033) (0.072) (0.048)
City-Level Bach. Share x 0.578 0.578 0.069 0.159 0.164 0.268
Industry Bach. Intensity (0.099) (0.046) (0.037) (0.029) (0.059) (0.039)
Log 1992 Av. Establishment -0.827 -0.660 -0.526 -0.452
Size in Region-Industry (0.009) (0.021) (0.013) (0.027)
Log 1992 Total Employment 0.966 0.779 0.935 0.732
in City-Industry (0.004) (0.013) (0.006) (0.018)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.04 0.81 0.79 0.88 0.63 0.81
City Fixed Effects X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X
Table 9:  Amenities, Education, Industry Location, and Entrepreneurship
 of Establishment over 1992-1999 by City-Industry
Notes:  See Table 8.  City and industry education shares taken from 1990 Census.
Dependent Variable is Log Employment in Indicated TypeStartup Startup Startup Facility Facility Facility
Entry Entry Entry Expansions Expansions Expansions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log 1992 Total Employment 0.976 0.758 0.972 1.090 0.838 1.069
in Region-Industry (0.013) (0.036) (0.011) (0.015) (0.038) (0.017)
Log 1992 Small Firm Share 0.543 0.400 0.512 0.181 0.069 -0.023
in Region-Industry (0.018) (0.043) (0.024) (0.027) (0.065) (0.015)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.84 0.93 0.69 0.88
Region Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X
Estimation Technique OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
Table A1:  Entry Rates and Regional Industrial Structure
Dep. Variable is Log Average Employment in Entering
Establishments over 1992-1999 by Region-Industry
Entry and Small Firm Share
Notes:  See Table 2.  Estimations quantify the relationship between entry and the share of employees in establishments with 
20 or fewer employees.  The region with the least industry employment is excluded for each industry in both OLS and IV 
specifications.  IV regressions instrument for observed region-industry small firm share with the 1992 value in the excluded 
region by industry.  The first stage relationship is 0.837 (0.014).  Mining Manu- Transport. Wholesale Finance, Services
and facturing & Utilities & Retail Insurance, &
Construction Trade Real Estate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log 1992 Total Employment 0.718 0.927 0.461 0.808 0.572 0.902
in Region-Industry (0.082) (0.064) (0.092) (0.060) (0.080) (0.055)
Log 1992 Av. Establishment -0.701 -0.825 -0.361 -0.256 -0.214 -0.426
Size in Region-Industry (0.195) (0.052) (0.143) (0.123) (0.158) (0.107)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.94 0.85 0.93 0.96 0.90 0.97
Region Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Log 1992 Total Employment 1.032 1.111 0.410 0.951 0.756 0.703
in Region-Industry (0.080) (0.097) (0.173) (0.060) (0.114) (0.085)
Log 1992 Av. Establishment -0.577 -0.688 0.120 -0.091 -0.031 0.053
Size in Region-Industry (0.361) (0.190) (0.191) (0.129) (0.148) (0.203)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.85 0.74 0.89 0.96 0.92 0.95
Region Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Notes:  See Table 2.  Estimations are undertaken by sector.
Table A2:  Entry Rates and Regional Industrial Structure by Sector
Dep. Variable is Log Average Employment in Entering
Establishments over 1992-1999 by Region-Industry
A.  Startup Entry by Sector
B. Facility Expansions by SectorTotal
Entry 1-5 6-20 21-100 101+
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log 1992 Total Employment 0.810 0.616 0.718 0.764 0.779
in Region-Industry (0.036) (0.036) (0.033) (0.075) (0.086)
Log 1992 Av. Establishment -0.638 -0.805 -0.849 -0.606 -0.217
Size in Region-Industry (0.046) (0.049) (0.050) (0.095) (0.124)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.93 0.98 0.96 0.89 0.65
Region Fixed Effects X X X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X X X
Log 1992 Total Employment 0.475 0.214 0.287 0.442 0.651
in Region-Industry (0.030) (0.034) (0.036) (0.037) (0.058)
Log 1992 HHI Concentration -0.167 -0.149 -0.179 -0.169 -0.098
in Region-Industry (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.037) (0.045)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.93 0.97 0.96 0.89 0.65
Region Fixed Effects X X X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X X X
Notes:  See Table 3.  Estimations include industry fixed effects and regional fixed effects.
Table A3:  Entry Size Distribution and Regional Industrial Structure
Entering Employment Of
Dep. Variable is Log Average Employment in Entering
Establishments over 1992-1999 by Region-Industry
A.  Entry and Average Establishment Size
B.  Entry and HHI Concentration IndexMining Manu- Transport. Wholesale Finance, Services
and facturing & Utilities & Retail Insurance, &
Construction Trade Real Estate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log 1992 Total Employment 0.089 0.043 0.042 0.102 0.034 0.005
in Region-Industry (0.039) (0.027) (0.064) (0.032) (0.073) (0.032)
Log 1992 Av. Establishment -0.072 -0.032 -0.090 0.020 0.103 0.068
Size in Region-Industry (0.169) (0.045) (0.111) (0.048) (0.141) (0.037)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.49 0.64 0.80 0.97 0.75 0.94
Region Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Log 1992 Total Employment 0.064 0.080 -0.020 -0.025 0.064 -0.001
in Region-Industry (0.055) (0.028) (0.053) (0.042) (0.130) (0.030)
Log 1992 Av. Establishment -0.012 -0.001 -0.122 0.124 0.137 0.042
Size in Region-Industry (0.070) (0.041) (0.103) (0.079) (0.134) (0.069)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.79 0.78 0.83 0.96 0.81 0.91
Region Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Table A4:  Labor Returns and Regional Industrial Structure by Sector
A.  Log 1997 Labor Returns in Single-Unit Firms in Region-Industry
B.  Log 1997 Labor Returns in Multi-Unit Firms in Region-Industry
Notes:  See Table 4.  Estimations are undertaken by sector.Dep. Variable is Log Linear Quintile
1990 House Price by City Specification Specification
Coastal Access 0.478 Coastal Access 0.507
(0.063) (0.069)
Log Average Annual  0.008 Snow Fall -0.054
Snow Fall (0.016) Q2 (0.089)
Log Average Annual  -0.206 -0.163
Precipitation (0.040) Q3 (0.120)
Log Average January  0.174 -0.047
Temperature (0.097) Q4 (0.137)
Log Average July -1.792 -0.027

























Adjusted R-Squared 0.40 Adjusted R-Squared 0.43
Table A5:  Amenities and Housing Prices
Notes:  Estimations consider log housing prices by city taken from the 1990 Census.  Predicted values 
from the regressions are used as composite amenities variables in main specifications.  Estimations 
contain 275 observations and report robust standard errors.Electricity Affordability -0.301 Electricity Intensity 0.010
Natural Gas Affordability -0.407 Natural Gas Intensity -0.036
Coal Affordability -0.476 Coal Intensity -0.019
Farmland Percentage -0.534 Livestock Intensity -0.095
Timberland Percentage 0.222 Lumber Intensity 0.245
Population Density 0.340 Final Cons. Sales Intensity -0.114
Table A6:  Climate-Based Amenities v. Traditional Natural Advantages 
Notes:  The first column presents pairwise correlations between calculated climate-based amenities and 
other forms of natural advantages at the state level excluding AK and HI.  The second column presents 
pairwise correlations between labor intensity of industries, measured as payroll divided by sales, and other 
dependencies for manufacturing industries.  These latter data are only available for the manufacturing 
sector.
Pairwise Correlation of Climate Amenities
and Other Natural Advantages by State
Pairwise Correlation of Labor Intensity
and Other Dependencies by Industry